Skip to content

Services, Wiki-Artikel, Blog-Beiträge und Glossar-Einträge durchsuchen

↑↓NavigierenEnterÖffnenESCSchließen
Penetration Testing Glossary

Red Team / Blue Team / Purple Team - Angriff und Verteidigung im Einklang

The Red Team simulates realistic attacks over an extended period (weeks/months) against the company’s actual defenses—without the Blue Team’s (SOC/Incident Response) knowledge. Blue Team: Defense, detection, and response. Purple Team: Red and Blue teams collaborate for maximum learning impact. Difference from penetration testing: Red Team tests processes and people, not just technology. TIBER-EU as a standardized Red Team framework for the financial sector.

Red Team vs. Blue Team is more than just a simulation framework—it’s the most honest answer to the question: “How secure are we, really?” While a penetration test identifies vulnerabilities in systems, a red team engagement tests whether the entire defense—technology, processes, and people—can withstand a real-world attack.

Red Team: What It Really Is

Distinction: Red Team vs. Penetration Test

CriterionPenetration TestRed Team
Time1–5 days4–12 weeks
ScopeDefined systemsEntire organization
GoalAll vulnerabilitiesAchieve objectives (steal data, gain domain admin access)
TransparencyBlue Team is awareBlue Team is NOT aware
DepthBroad + DocumentationDeep, realistic
ReportTechnical FindingsAttack Narrative + Detection Gaps

Red Team Objectives (Examples)

  • Access to customer database (50,000+ records)
  • Domain admin credentials
  • Access to financial systems
  • Physical access to server room
  • Exfiltration of intellectual property

Red Team Phases

1. Reconnaissance (passive + active):

  • OSINT: LinkedIn, WHOIS, Shodan, job postings
  • Infrastructure discovery: subdomains, IP ranges, email servers
  • Social Media: Employee profiles, organizational structure
  • Dark Web: Previous leaks, sold credentials

2. Initial Access:

  • Phishing (spear-phishing, vishing)
  • Exploitation of public services (CVE)
  • Physical (tailgating, lockpicking)
  • Supply chain (compromised service provider)
  • Insider (social engineering)

3. Persistence + C2:

  • Custom C2 (Cobalt Strike, Brute Ratel, Havoc)
  • Persistence: Registry, WMI, Scheduled Tasks
  • Staging: multiple independent foothold points

4. Lateral Movement:

  • Pass-the-Hash, Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting
  • BloodHound: Visualize attack paths
  • Living-off-the-Land: PSExec, WMI, RDP

5. Objectives:

  • Data Exfiltration (DNS tunnel, HTTPS, steganography)
  • Domain Compromise (Golden Ticket)
  • Ransomware Simulation (without Encryption)

Blue Team: Structuring the Defense

Detection Capabilities

  • SIEM: Centralize and correlate logs
  • EDR: Endpoint Detection (Behavioral Analytics)
  • NDR: Network anomaly detection
  • UEBA: User + Entity Behavior Analytics
  • Honeypots/Canary Tokens: Early warning system

Response Capabilities

  • SOC: Security Operations Center (24/7 or business hours)
  • IR Playbooks: for known attack patterns
  • SOAR: Automated Response (block IP, lock account)
  • Forensic Capabilities: post-incident

Purple Team Activities (continuous)

  • Atomic Red Team: test detection with small, isolated attacks
  • Caldera (MITRE): automated ATT&CK simulation;
  • VECTR: Tracking of Purple Team activities
# Atomic Red Team Example:
# Test: Kerberoasting (T1558.003)
Invoke-AtomicTest T1558.003
# → Does SIEM trigger an alert? → YES: Detection works!
# → NO: Adjust SIEM rule + add Sigma rule

Blue Team Metrics

MTTD: Mean Time to Detect

  • Good: < 24h for Red Team actions
  • Poor: > 1 week (enables lateral movement)

MTTR: Mean Time to Respond (Time to Containment)

  • Good: < 4h after detection
  • Poor: > 24h

False Positive Rate:

  • Too many alerts = alert fatigue → SOC no longer responds
  • Target: < 10% false positives among all alerts

TIBER-EU Framework

What TIBER-EU Is

  • European Framework for Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red Teaming
  • ECB + National Central Banks (BaFin, DNB, etc.)
  • Mandatory for: systemically important financial institutions in the EU

TIBER-EU Phases

1. Generic Threat Landscape (GTL):

  • Industry-specific threats (via threat intelligence providers)
  • Who is attacking the financial sector? With which TTPs?

2. Targeted Threat Intelligence (TTI):

  • Specific to the institution
  • Threat intelligence providers: Which groups are attacking this institution?
  • What public information is available?

3. Red Teaming:

  • Red team provider (accredited!)
  • 12–16-week engagement
  • Objectives: based on TTI (realistic attackers!)
  • White team: small management team is aware of this (not the Blue Team!)

4. Closure + Remediation:

  • Report → Blue Team: what did we miss?
  • Remediation: technical + procedural
  • Replay (optional): Red Team tests fixes

German TIBER variant: DTIBER (Deutsche Bundesbank)

  • Coordinated by BaFin
  • Accredited providers (Threat Intel + Red Team separate!)
  • Results: confidential (no public report)

TIBER-EU vs. Standard Penetration Test (Financial Sector)

  • TIBER: realistic attack scenario, weeks-long, in-depth
  • Penetration test: meet compliance requirements (PCI DSS, ISO 27001)
  • Both: useful, but different goals

Purple Team: The Best of Both Worlds

Concept

  • Red Team carries out the attack
  • Blue Team attempts to detect it
  • Joint analysis: what worked, what didn’t?
  • Create detection rules directly from the attack

Purple Team Session (typically 2–3 days)

Day 1:

  • Red Team: executes T1059.001 (PowerShell Execution)
  • Blue Team: Check SIEM alerts → detected? Timing?
  • If not detected: why? → Detection gap identified!
  • Write and deploy detection rule

Day 2:

  • Red Team: attempts same technique with obfuscation
  • Blue Team: Does the new rule work?
  • Iterate until robust!

MITRE ATT&CK as a common language

ATT&CK Navigator: which techniques are covered? Heatmap: detected (green), not detected (red), unclear (yellow). Prioritization: which critical techniques are missing?

Common Detection Gaps (Purple Team Findings):

  • Living-off-the-Land: WMI/LOLBins → too many false positives → disabled
  • NTLM Relay: no monitoring of NTLM authentication events
  • DNS Exfiltration: no DNS log monitoring
  • Scheduled Tasks via schtasks.exe: no alert

Tools for Purple Team

ToolVendorPurpose
Atomic Red TeamRed CanarySmallest atomic ATT&CK tests;
MITRE CalderaMITREAutomated adversary simulation
VECTR-Purple team tracking + metrics
Prelude Operator-Modern purple team platform
Infection MonkeyGuardicoreAutonomous lateral movement simulation