IT emergency management: incident response and crisis management
A structured guide to IT incident management: from developing an incident response plan and managing the first 72 hours following a cyberattack to legal reporting requirements under NIS2 and the GDPR. Includes templates and checklists.
Table of Contents (7 sections)
IT Incident Management is the organized preparation for, response to, and recovery from IT security incidents. The difference between a disaster and a successfully managed incident often lies solely in the existence of a good plan.
The NIST Incident Response Framework
The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) defines 4 phases:
Phase 1: PREPARATION
→ Create an incident response plan
→ Define the team, clarify roles
→ Provide tools (forensic software, backup systems)
→ Conduct regular drills (tabletop exercises)
Phase 2: DETECTION & ANALYSIS
→ Detect the incident (SIEM alert, user report, external report)
→ Assess scope and severity
→ Back up logs (do not overwrite!)
→ Document timestamps
Phase 3: CONTAINMENT, ERADICATION & RECOVERY
(Containment, Eradication & Recovery)
→ Stop the spread of damage
→ Remove the attacker from the system
→ Gradually restore systems
Phase 4: POST-INCIDENT ACTIVITIES
→ Root Cause Analysis
→ Lessons Learned
→ Improve processes
→ Finalize regulatory reports
The Incident Response Plan
Core Elements of an IR Plan
1. Incident Classification Matrix
Severity Levels:
P1 - CRITICAL:
Ongoing ransomware attack
Complete system/network failure
Active APT compromise
→ Immediate escalation to C-level
→ Fully activate crisis team
P2 - HIGH:
Compromised admin account
Loss of sensitive data
Malware on multiple systems
→ Notify IT management and CISO
→ Activate forensic service provider
P3 - MEDIUM:
Compromised standard user account
Malware on a single endpoint (isolated)
Phishing email opened
→ Standard IT security process
P4 - LOW:
Spam campaign, no clicks
Suspicious email reported
→ Documentation, standard response
2. RACI Matrix (Roles and Responsibilities)
Person/Role Detect Decide Communicate Remediate
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
IT Administrator R/A I I R
CISO/IT Manager I R/A R A
Executive Management I A (P1/P2) R (external) I
PR / Communications I I R/A (external) I
Data Protection Officer I R (GDPR) R (authorities) I
Forensic Service Provider I C I R/A
Legal Department I C R (legal) C
R=Responsible, A=Accountable, C=Consulted, I=Informed
3. Contact List (24/7)
Internal:
CISO/IT Manager: [Name] [Mobile] [Signal]
CEO: [Name] [Mobile]
Data Protection Officer: [Name] [Mobile]
IT Emergency Hotline: [Number] (24/7)
External - On-call (contractual):
Forensics/IR Service: [Company] [Number] [SLA: 4-hour response]
Cyber Lawyer: [Law Firm] [Contact Person]
Cyber Insurance: [Policy No.] [Claims Hotline]
Authorities:
BSI / CERT-Bund: 0800 274 1000 (toll-free)
LKA Cybercrime: [relevant LKA]
Data Protection Authority: [enter state authority]
The First 72 Hours - Timeline
Hours 0-1: Detection and Initial Response
0:00 - Alert received (SIEM, user, external report)
0:05 - IT administrator notified → Initial assessment
0:15 - CISO/IT director notified
0:20 - Determine scope: How many systems? What data?
0:30 – Decision: Severity level P1/P2/P3/P4?
0:45 – P1/P2: Convene crisis team, notify management
1:00 – Initial containment measures (isolate affected systems)
Hours 1–4: Containment
First goal: Stop the spread, don’t fix it!
For ransomware/malware:
✓ Disconnect affected systems from the network (physically disconnect cables)
✓ DO NOT shut down (forensic data in RAM will be lost)
✓ Back up logs BEFORE isolating systems
✓ Change passwords for all affected accounts
✓ Lock admin accounts → recreate with new credentials
For compromised accounts:
✓ Deactivate account (do not delete—forensic evidence)
✓ Invalidate all sessions
✓ Check all of the user’s devices
✓ What data did the account have access to? → Define scope
Hours 4–24: GDPR Reporting Obligation
GDPR Art. 33:
24h: Initial assessment of whether personal data is affected
72h: If affected → Report to data protection authority
Report form includes:
→ Type of incident (ransomware, data breach, etc.)
→ Categories and approximate number of affected individuals
→ Likely consequences
→ Measures taken
If unclear: Preliminary notification ("precautionary notification") is possible
"Incident detected, scope still unclear, update to follow"
Hours 24–72: NIS2 reporting obligation (for affected companies)
NIS2 Art. 23:
24h: Early warning to BSI
→ Incident type, initial assessment
→ No full report required
72h: Full report
→ Cause, if known
→ Impact and countermeasures
30 days: Final report
Reporting office: BSI / CERT-Bund (online portal)
Forensics: Securing evidence
Important: Secure forensic evidence before systems are cleaned or reset.
Artifacts to be secured:
Memory (RAM):
→ Memory dump before shutdown (contains running processes, credentials)
→ Tools: DumpIt, WinPmem, LiME (Linux)
Hard drives:
→ Forensic copy (bit-for-bit copy) BEFORE cleaning
→ Hash value (SHA256) for chain of evidence
→ Tools: dd, FTK Imager, EnCase
Logs:
→ Windows Event Logs (System, Security, Application)
→ PowerShell logs (Module Logging, Script Block Logging)
→ Firewall logs, proxy logs, DNS logs
→ SIEM export for the last 30–90 days
Network:
→ All outbound connections from the last few hours/days
→ PCAP captures if available
Business Continuity During the Incident
Questions that must be answered immediately:
Communication:
→ How does the company communicate during the incident?
→ Email may be compromised → Signal/Threema as a backup?
→ External communication: who speaks with customers, the press, and authorities?
Operations:
→ Can critical processes continue to run manually?
→ Which systems are critical vs. non-critical?
→ Are there hot-standby systems?
Backup:
→ When was the last clean backup?
→ Have backups also been encrypted by the attacker?
→ Recovery Time Objective (RTO): When must operations be back up and running?
Tabletop Exercise - Practicing Incident Response
The best preparation is practice—before things get serious:
Tabletop Exercise Format:
Duration: 2–4 hours
Participants: IT, management, communications, legal
Format: Scenario is read aloud; team discusses response
Sample Scenario:
"Monday, 6:30 a.m. Employees call in: all servers display
encrypted files and a ransom demand.
What will you do in the next 60 minutes?"
Evaluation:
→ How long did it take until the first alert?
→ Were all contacts reachable?
→ Did everyone know their role?
→ What gaps in the plan were discovered?
Lessons Learned and Continuous Improvement
After each incident (P1-P3):
Post-Incident Review (within 1–2 weeks):
→ Reconstruct the incident timeline
→ Root Cause Analysis: How did the attacker gain access?
→ What worked? What didn’t?
→ What controls could have prevented this or detected it earlier?
Typical findings:
"MFA was missing on the VPN → Immediate action: Implement MFA"
"SIEM had no rule for this attack → Create new SIEM rule"
"Backup restoration took 8 hours → RTO not met → Revise backup strategy"
"Communication paths unclear → Update RACI"
IT incident management is not a one-time project—it is a continuous process consisting of preparation, practice, response, and improvement.
Sources & References
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About the Author
Dipl.-Math. (WWU Münster) und Promovend am Promotionskolleg NRW (Hochschule Rhein-Waal) mit Forschungsschwerpunkt Phishing-Awareness, Behavioral Security und Nudging in der IT-Sicherheit. Verantwortet den Aufbau und die Pflege von ISMS, leitet interne Audits nach ISO/IEC 27001:2022 und berät als externer ISB in KRITIS-Branchen. Lehrbeauftragter für Communication Security an der Hochschule Rhein-Waal und NIS2-Schulungsleiter bei der isits AG.
3 Publikationen
- Different Seas, Different Phishes — Large-Scale Analysis of Phishing Simulations Across Different Industries (2025)
- Self-promotion with a Chance of Warnings: Exploring Cybersecurity Communication Among Government Institutions on LinkedIn (2024)
- Exploring the Effects of Cybersecurity Awareness and Decision-Making Under Risk (2024)